Bernardo Santos
Within the tradition of modern democratic thought, it is common to encounter a multifaceted divide between the claims of two concepts that, although distinct, cannot be completely separated: liberty and equality. Since they are the cornerstone of democratic thought in itself, this apparent divide usually involves more of a balancing between both sets of claims rather than an outright opposition. Still, this tension has given rise to crucial conceptual and ideological distinctions. For instance, we find it in Rousseau’s and Locke’s variants of social contract theory, Constant’s distinction between ancient and modern liberties, socialism’s critique of capitalism, and more recently in the competing theories of justice put forth by egalitarianism and liberalism. The relation between liberty and equality is, thus, a core preoccupation of modern political philosophy, and liberal-democratic regimes continue to grapple with its pervasive challenges: should the claims of equality apply only to formal political and juridical liberties (namely, as equal rights), or should they extend to the substantial socioeconomic realm, through redistributive policies?
It is this connection that gives title and a guiding thread to Raymond Aron’s final lecture, “Liberty and Equality”, delivered at the Collège de France in 1978, which has now been translated to English by Samuel Garrett Zeitlin and edited by Princeton University Press. In this lecture, Aron focuses his discussion on the concept of liberty and delves into the multiple philosophical, political, and sociological implications of this abstract idea. As a lecture, one can clearly sense the expository and discursive character of the text, that is more concerned with revealing the many qualities and open pathways of this concept, rather than presenting a conclusive theory and definition of what political liberty is and how it manifests itself. Hence, of the common formula of liberty as “the power to do whatever does not harm another”, Aron says that it is “at once, in one sense evident and in another sense almost denuded of meaning” (p. 7), since it manifests itself differently among societies and cannot unequivocally guide us in political matters. Given this inherent elusiveness of a philosophical concept of liberty, the author sets out to, “without pretending to make a general theory of liberties to all societies, […] attempt here and now to specify what is the content of our liberties, in our democratic, prosperous, and liberal countries […]” (pp. 8-9).
The preoccupation with liberty, placing it at the center of political reflection, evidently suggests Aron’s affinity with liberalism – an affinity that the author himself affirmed throughout his life. As pointed out in the preface of this edition, authored by Mark Lilla, Aron draws from the tradition of French liberalism, namely that of Montesquieu and Tocqueville. Aron’s analysis of the concept of liberty, besides the traditional formal and philosophical elements of liberalism, is greatly preoccupied with its sociological and psychological aspects – a perspective that was not so common in classical anglophone liberalism. This includes a reflection on the subjective feeling of liberty and how it influences the citizen’s perspective of the political regime (p.21), but, most importantly, a methodology marked by the epistemical caution of a social scientist: there’s no appeal to a rational or universalistic quality of liberal principles (which, in his own words, given their abstract character, “may neither enlighten us nor guide us” [p. 27]). Instead, Aron is sensible to the possible cultural circumscription of the concepts employed, and directs his conclusions to modern western societies, without generalizing them to all human communities. This trait is, of course, in line with Montesquieu’s and Tocqueville’s sociological approach to liberalism.
As for the traditional liberal elements, Aron starts by underlying the idea of surety (p. 5) as the most significant aspect of political liberty in a lawful society. This broad notion points to the view that laws and state apparatus serve primarily as mechanisms for guaranteeing and consolidating an individual’s rights and freedoms. To be politically free would mean to be sure of the inviolability and efficacy of one’s right claims. Furthermore, the formulation of liberty as surety ends up encompassing the two main motivations of liberalism: security and property. The latter, Aron claims, given its presence “in every society”, is part of the “fundamental rights” of individuals (p. 6).
The “surety or the protection of the individuals” (p. 9) is but one of four categories of personal liberties identified by Aron. To this, the author adds the liberty of free movement (p. 10), economic liberties such as freedom of initiative (p. 11) and, finally, liberty of expression (p. 12). Yet, these four categories are part of a greater divide between personal liberties (which consist in those four categories), political liberties, such as voting, protesting, and assembling (p. 12), and social liberties (or “social rights”), namely welfare and labor rights. After cataloguing these as the liberties of western liberal democracies, Aron presents the reader with two philosophical problems that he feels “obliged to treat very rapidly despite their complexity” (p. 27). The first is the following: does one particular set of liberties consist in liberty par excellence? The second, closely related, is: what is the relation between the political and social liberties, and the philosophy of liberty? Hence, it is at this point that the author approaches the fundamental question of the relation between liberty – exemplified by the political and personal liberties – and equality – here presented in the form of social rights.
To answer the first problem, Aron, the sociologist, simply claims that to uphold one single ideal of liberty implies “elaborating a vision of the good society” (p. 28). This means that to choose the liberties which we believe to be essential is to do it in light of a political ideology. Aron’s first direct involvement with the question of the relation of liberty and equality consequently ends up adopting this empirical, descriptive, and distanced perspective, a perspective in which the author clearly prefers to position himself. Yet, despite this first approach, Aron’s discussion develops and moves away from this apparent Weberian neutrality. After discussing the example of the Soviet Union and its attempt to extinguish inequality through the construction of classless society, Aron concludes that the domination of a minority over the majority of the population seems to be the inevitable result of modern politics: “the domination of man by man exists in all societies know at the present time; what differentiates between societies is the mode of exercising this power by the ruling minorities […]” (p. 34). Given this quality of present societies, Aron, the political theorist, ends up inclining towards liberalism, and, therefore, positioning himself in the philosophical and ideological spectrum: since all contemporary societal forms imply such domination, we should opt for the one that avoids the “extreme forms of the privation of liberty which we have known across this century” (p. 36). Despite the imperfections and fallibility of liberal democracies – a fact underlined repeatedly – it is still the political system which is closer to achieve a just society.
Aron then delves deeper into philosophical terrain, further elaborating his view and revealing the contours of his liberalism. He claims that one finds in some theorists a “confusion between liberty and equality” (p. 38): these theorists, by erroneously equating liberty to the power and ability to act, conclude that “those who have more resources, more means, those who are higher in the social hierarchy, are more free than others” (p. 39). Aron instead believes than we should retain “the strict and rigorous sense of liberty – liberty as equal right” (ibid.). For if we understand liberty as equal right instead of liberty as equal power, we should be able to comprehend how unequal powers do not entail the diminishment of one’s liberty. This consists, of course, in a classically liberal thesis that prioritizes the creation of equal opportunities through law, but not of equal outcomes. Although this thesis is sound considered in abstraction, one should confront it with the fact that historically certain social and ethnic groups have been legally barred from such a level playing field. Considering these injustices in the origin of certain contemporary unequal outcomes, one can make a strong case for a more affirmative understanding of liberty and equality. Thus, even if liberty strictly entails equal rights only, attaining this equality may require more nuanced and tailored policies rather than a uniform ‘one size fits all’ approach.
Aron then concludes his consideration of political liberty with some interesting notes that, once again, diverge from the most conventional type of liberalism. Firstly, he points out that “in the majority of Western societies, liberty essentially means the liberation of the desires” (pp. 46-7), thus being comprehended in a hedonistic manner as the realization of an individual’s aspirations. With this philosophical ideal of liberty, political liberty would, in turn, simply equate to a negative freedom, in which there’s an absence of limitations or obstructions to the realization of these desires. Aron then notices that this implies an abandonment of the positive ideal of freedom in politics, where freedom instead consists in a capacity to obey one’s reason and includes a conception of a good society and of the virtuous citizen. This abandonment prompts the author to wonder:
Our societies are legitimate in the eyes of the members, but they have no other ideal than that of permitting to each the choice of one’s path. I share this ideal. I participate in this manner of thinking of the society in which I live. But as an observer of societies in history, I ask myself: is it possible to give stability to democratic regimes of which the principle of legitimacy is election and of which the ideal is the right or the liberty for everyone choosing not only one’s path in life, which is just, but in addition one’s conception of good and evil? The fact is that today it seems to me extremely difficult […] to speak seriously of the duties of the citizens. (p. 50)
On the one hand, the abandonment of such an ideal of positive freedom (a position in line with mainstream liberalism) stands on the reasonable preoccupation of how the conjunction of politics with moral ideals is treacherous ground since it can give rise to abuses of fundamental rights based on highly ideological premises. Yet, one can legitimately wonder with Aron if the morally narrow sense of liberal democracy does not stand weakened by its own lack of a strong democratic morality, which would serve to appeal to civic duty and the defense of democratic institutions. This passage excellently reminds us of the delicate balance that democratic regimes must maintain, and how this presents a challenge intrinsic to their nature: they must remain neutral enough as to allow for ethical diversity, but not so neutral as to allow the weakening of democracy.
The greatest strength of Aron’s final lecture resides precisely in this type of sound and impartial analysis of the principles and challenges of liberal democracy. To the contemporary reader, this reflection is undoubtedly insightful since the problems it addresses are as significant as they were in the past century. Furthermore, this lecture isn’t confined to a narrow position in the spectrum of democratic political alternatives. Besides standard liberal views, we also find some truly progressive stances that suggest that Aron’s own opinions sometimes surpass the image of a thinker attached to common sense and moderation: the most striking example are his thoughts on the hierarchical organization of labor, and how the “omnipotence of the bosses of the firms” (p. 13) should be refuted with the introduction of democratic procedures and structures in the workplace. Aron goes as far as to claim that “one of the fundamental contradictions of our societies is that professional life is not organized according to democratic principles” (p. 14).
These are the type of critical notes that the reader should rightfully expect from an insightful discussion on democracy, and, therefore, one of the reasons to revisit Raymond Aron’s work.
REFERÊNCIA:
Aron, Raymond. Liberty and Equality. Translated by Samuel Garrett Zeitlin. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2023.
