Bernardo Santos

Within the tradition of modern democratic thought, it is common to encounter a multifaceted divide between the claims of two concepts that, although distinct, cannot be completely separated: liberty and equality. Since they are the cornerstone of democratic thought in itself, this apparent divide usually involves more of a balancing between both sets of claims rather than an outright opposition. Still, this tension has given rise to crucial conceptual and ideological distinctions. For instance, we find it in Rousseau’s and Locke’s variants of social contract theory, Constant’s distinction between ancient and modern liberties, socialism’s critique of capitalism, and more recently in the competing theories of justice put forth by egalitarianism and liberalism. The relation between liberty and equality is, thus, a core preoccupation of modern political philosophy, and liberal-democratic regimes continue to grapple with its pervasive challenges: should the claims of equality apply only to formal political and juridical liberties (namely, as equal rights), or should they extend to the substantial socioeconomic realm, through redistributive policies?