Author’s disclaimer: This essay was originally written in English and subsequently translated to Portuguese by Violeta Magalhães for this special issue of Forma de Vida. The translated version can be accessed through the link.
Gender theory (or theories) was developed and established throughout the last century, within the emerging field of “Women Studies.” As happens with most striking theories, however, they had been surreptitiously built over many years. They have their fathers and mothers, their primitive appearances, their proto-theses, their blooming and finally their decay. We shall speak of the unsuspecting contributions given to these theories by three remarkable personalities of the 18th century, a woman and two men, with very strong ideas regarding the social relations between sexes and the political consequences of these circumstances. We shall present three questions in the following sections:
1. Mary Wollstonecraft, a predecessor of gender theory?
2. William Godwin, an honest lover?
3. Rousseau, an enemy to cast down?
Mary Wollstonecraft, a predecessor of gender theory?
Mary Wollstonecraft was born at the height of the Age of Enlightenment, into a middle-class family steadily losing its social status due to the excesses of an irascible, alcoholic, and despotic father. After deciding to strike out on her own, she managed to find herself a position in society and provided for her own means of subsistence.
Her circle of friends favours innovation but is a social and cultural elite, where the feminine universe is a minority. At a time when the literary and philosophical “salons” are in full swing in France, most English women are still limited to the private sphere and house chores. As Wollstonecraft points out, if British women are to be blamed for anything, it is certainly not for their intellectual claims but, on the contrary, for their ignorance and narrow-mindedness (Wollstonecraft 1994, 65). Besides, far from being objected to, such shortcomings are encouraged as qualities proper to femininity. It is precisely this state of affairs that Wollstonecraft rebels against; she fights it not only in the theoretical field but also through her own lifestyle. In fact, the question is not to devise more or less appealing theories, but to fight for a cause rooted in real-life experiences, which must be conquered by study and backed with valid arguments.
To make women assume the dignity they are entitled to implies an effort. It demands that they are given an education based on well-defined aims, on the eradication of prejudices, and on steady guidelines in the wake of the French Revolution’s ideology, which Wollstonecraft believed had never taken the feminine public sphere into account:
That women at present are by ignorance rendered foolish or vicious, is, I think, not to be disputed; and, that the most salutary effects tending to improve mankind might be expected from a REVOLUTION in female manners, appears at least, with a face of probability. (Wollstonecraft 1994, 281)
One of the cornerstones of Wollstonecraft's thought is the full humanity of women. The equality of rights she champions in her A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1994 [1792]) unquestionably places her in the field of egalitarian feminism. She strongly advocates an education which makes women autonomous beings and values them as rational creatures. She seeks to dispute certain representations of women by pointing out what is unfair, prejudiced or even unscientific about them. A case in point is Buffon, whose work she takes to be an example of disingenuous handling of empirical data with the intent of supporting commonplace theses. For this French scientist, women attain physical maturity earlier than men: a twenty-year-old woman has already entered her prime, whereas a man cannot be considered mature before he is thirty. Wollstonecraft is not intimidated by the scientific prestige of the author of these theses; on the contrary, she refutes them resolutely, claiming that none of them stands the test of real-life experience.
What, then, supports such theses? For her, the explanation lies in the superficial acceptance of the predominant ideology and the evaluation of women based on appearance alone. Defying the merely physical perspective, she contends that women should be seen in their entirety, as having both body and mind. In her Vindication, she concludes that an adequate concept of humankind must be based on the recognition that men and women share the same maturation rhythms: “Strength of body, and that character of countenance, which the French term as physionomie, women do not acquire before thirty, any more than men” (Wollstonecraft 1994, 140).
Wollstonecraft particularly dislikes those models of interpretation which consider that the world of women always comes second. One is the male chauvinist Bible, issued from ignorance and fed on self-indulgence, in which women are seen as second-class beings, halfway between animals and humans. It is precisely to fight such views and to stand for the rights of her own sex, that the author dares to write Vindication: “I plead for my sex – not for myself” (Wollstonecraft 1994, 65).
Other ways of referring to women are less negative but equally irritating, and she identifies them as downright patronizing. Wollstonecraft blames them not only for the consequences they have but also for the biased concepts they imply. As they try to protect women from possible dangers, all they do is belittle them, underestimating their physical and psychic potential and turning them into angelic beings, deprived of the fullness of their humanity. Hence her stern reviews of some popular works of her time.[1]
This is the case with A Father’s Legacy to His Daughters by John Gregory, whose honey-tongued tone displeases her. Wollstonecraft feels inclined to like the book because of the affection its author shows for his wife and daughters; however, she disagrees with the way in which it praises appearances and advises women to feign ignorance, lest the opposite sex is driven away by an excessive display of knowledge (Wollstonecraft and Godwin 1987, 172-3). She considers some theses particularly harmful, namely: the identification of femininity with fragility; the notion that it is in women’s nature to be vain, and hence that their interest in clothes should be encouraged; the idea that women are expected to be of friendly disposition, etc.
Wollstonecraft resorts to the same arguments in her harsh criticism of Lord Chesterfield and Fordyce, who wrote didactic works on women’s upbringing. She blames the former for being too protective, accusing him of turning women into faint-hearted, shy creatures; as to the latter, she finds him pretentious and vain in his use of shallow words better fit for underdeveloped minds. She refuses cheap sentimentality, considering it to be a threat to women’s dignity. Such works as the ones just mentioned are deemed to have a negative effect, and people are most emphatically advised not to read them. Women’s fulfilment as human beings by right cannot yield to cultural standards opposed to their rights. Hence Wollstonecraft’s proximity to a philosophy of gender of which she is a predecessor.
In an article on the role of gender in conceptions of rationality, Sandra Harding (1984) points out that periods of scientific and technological revolutions bring about higher levels of coercion against women. Consequently, in her analysis of the relevance of historical periodization, Harding warns against the danger of identifying new times and scientific and technological breakthroughs, while overlooking the fact that the latter were contemporaneous with (or even contributed towards) the repression of women.[2]
Harding’s article reminds us that the society of the Enlightenment, notwithstanding its progressive ideals, underrates women. In fact, Wollstonecraft's struggle can be seen as the first stage in the establishment of women’s rights, a fight striving to assign women the dignity ascribed to full human beings. The rights she defends are valid regardless of sex or gender. Biological differences between sexes cannot be used as pretexts to belittle those who are physically weaker or to subject them to insults or humiliations encouraged by their vulnerability. Not only does Wollstonecraft criticize physical violence against a certain number of women, but she also denounces psychological violence. It is unacceptable that women, just because they are women, must endure innuendos, jokes and offensive comments by men who are allowed to get away with it (Wollstonecraft 1994, 202).
Her wish to humanize women leads her to emphasize human nature as a whole―a sexless concept. Nature would then be defined according to criteria of perfectibility and educability regardless of sex: “Contending, therefore, that the sexual distinction which men have so warmly insisted upon, is arbitrary” (Wollstonecraft 1994, 282). Reason, feeling, imagination and the capacity to make associations, mental and physical agility, are common to both sexes. There are no different sets of virtues for men and women. Understandably, Wollstonecraft tries to deconstruct both the qualities wrongly attributed to women and the requirements they are expected to meet while men are free from such constraints. Why must a woman be beautiful when such a quality is not deemed necessary in a man? What is the point of assessing human beings for their physical appearance?
Wollstonecraft dedicates many pages of her Vindication to a critical assessment of certain clichés that are usually applied to women: childishness, politeness or modesty, “pseudo-virtues” she ends up downgrading to a level of narrow-mindedness (Wollstonecraft 1994, 85). She, therefore, states that what is good for women must also be good for men and advocates for the advantages of pursuing an ethical sexual uniformization. Both men and women are born to be autonomous and free; however, the way they are educated jeopardizes this possibility. Women are the worst victims, as it is more difficult for them to have access to the path to equality. It is up to the State to defend the weak, and it should, therefore, pay preferential attention to women (Wollstonecraft 1994, 287-301).
Given the specific existential situation of the two sexes, Wollstonecraft advocates for a different approach to each. She contends that the Parliament should include women, a proposal that feminists would later put forward by fighting for equal representation. Society leads women towards a precocious and undue sexualization of the mind and is responsible for absurdly differentiated behaviours (Wollstonecraft 1994, 192). A harbinger of radical feminism, Wollstonecraft studies etiquette, fashion, certain rituals and idiosyncrasies. She consequently ridicules obsolete rites of passage such as debutante balls, where young girls were presented to society (Wollstonecraft 1984, 255). She resents men’s gallantry and considers it inadequate and even offensive. Why can’t a woman shut a door behind her or pick up a handkerchief? What reason is there to consider that only men are brave? Why should women be reduced to hothouse flowers and have their physical strength thwarted? (Wollstonecraft 1994, 126-7). What is the point of pretending they are fragile creatures in body and mind when this does not correspond to the truth? The socially constructed stereotyped ideal of women presents them as extremely delicate, rather sickly beings, always on the verge of collapse, too weak to stand adversity. “Born a woman―and born to suffer”: that is how the central character of Wollstonecraft’s novel Maria (1798) defines herself (Wollstonecraft 1992, 133). However, the truth is that the representation of femininity has always been men’s business.
Although she does not use the words sex and gender, Wollstonecraft is indeed a pioneer when it comes to distinguishing between these two concepts, thus paving the way for separating the biological and the cultural. In the Introduction to Vindication, when she writes about the rather unhealthy condition of all that pertains to women, Wollstonecraft holds men responsible for certain notions concerning women, which have caused undue confusion between what belongs to nature as opposed to nurture:
The conduct and manners of women, in fact, evidently prove that their minds are not in a healthy state; for, like the flowers which are planted in too rich a soil, strength and usefulness are sacrificed to beauty […]. One cause of this barren blooming I attribute to a false system of education, gathered from the books written on this subject by men, who, considering females rather as women than human creatures, have been more anxious to make them alluring mistresses than affectionate wives and rational mothers. (Wollstonecraft 1994, 71; my emphasis)
To complement this demystification, Wollstonecraft points out “feminine” features in men, above all in those who would be expected to assert themselves through their virility, such as members of the military. In fact, these men, who are supposed to be paradigmatic of a masculine way of life, behave in a frivolous way when out of duty and are notorious for their gallantry and shallowness. The truth is that society tolerates certain behaviours from men and disapproves of them when it comes to women. Hence, while those men are theoretically in the antipodes of a feminine worldview, they are in fact quite close to it (Wollstonecraft 1994, 82 and ff.), making up a good example in support of Wollstonecraft's stance against biological determinism and for the equality of rights.
Deprived of any biological or psychic basis, sex-related idiosyncrasies are artificial, imaginary constructs thriving under the influence of current counterproductive educational laws. However, most of the time, women themselves are responsible for perpetuating these constructs, for they yield to the dominant ideology, either due to inertia or meanness. Wollstonecraft denounces certain stereotypes but, considering the reasons that motivated them, she also offers different justifications for them. This is the case when she blames women for being lazy and unwilling to be bothered to change the situation they find themselves in; or when she underlines that they prefer to enjoy the present moment and forget about the promising future they should be fighting for; or, again, when she realizes women find it more difficult to generalize ideas or carry out mental activities which imply abstraction. (Wollstonecraft 1994, 121-123).
It should be stressed that such flaws are by no means constitutive of women’s nature but are rather acquired as a consequence of a deficient education. The harsh portrait Wollstonecraft traces of women does not mean she accepts the validity of every criticism directed at women, especially when coming from a prejudiced or conformist mentality. She refuses to consider women from a male point of view, and not only does she question the disparaging remarks made by men, but also what men patronizingly value in women. It is a well-known fact that a typically masculine way of looking at women is to consider them as sex objects, which entails the usual crude confusion between reputation and virtue. Society considers virginity the sole code of feminine honour, and a woman’s behaviour is good if it is chaste:
But, with respect to reputation, the attention is confined to a single virtue – chastity. If the honour of a woman, as it is absurdly called, be safe, she may neglect every social duty; nay, ruin her family by gaming and extravagance; yet, still present a shameless front – for truly she is an honourable woman! (Wollstonecraft 1994, 216)
Such hypocrisy is unacceptable for Wollstonecraft who, as mentioned above, insists upon the distinction between sex and gender. That is why she cannot accept the virtue of modesty as exclusively linked to sexuality and only valued in women. For her, a modest man is as legitimate as a modest woman (Wollstonecraft 1994, 198 and 209). Men and women are human beings with equal rights and equal duties. The stereotypes associated with them are issued from the dominant ideology and should not be given any credit. The basis for a gender theory has been laid.
William Godwin, an honest lover?
Although she wrote diaries (Wollstonecraft 1997) and spoke freely about herself in her works, the best-informed account of Mary Wollstonecraft was written by her lover-turned-husband William Godwin. Memoirs of the Author of the Rights of Woman (1987 [1798]) is a posthumous book that would have certainly displeased Wollstonecraft. The reason is that Godwin resorts to the usual stereotypes connected to the masculine/feminine dichotomy in his outline of a gender theory (that he does not identify as such), in which some influence of Rousseau can be detected. The book adopts a rather patronizing approach, namely when depicting Wollstonecraft as Godwin’s complement and displaying a deep lack of discretion when describing her life: her unhappy love stories and suicide attempts, her slow agony and her death following childbirth. At the same time, in this biography, we get to know how her childhood and adolescence were marked by a despotic father, namely in the deficient education she was given, in shocking contrast with the investment made in her brother, and the constant humiliations imposed on her mother. Wollstonecraft was a self-made woman, who never had access to the classical education in Latin and Greek of the scholars of her time. A compulsive reader by obligation and vocation, she was intellectually motivated by the stream of texts that fell into her hands. While working and writing reviews for a newspaper, she furthered her education by reading books that happened to come her way, by going abroad (to Portugal, France, and Sweden), and mainly by reflecting on everyday life, which she lived intensely and passionately.
It is not our purpose to analyze Godwin’s thought or to go into a detailed comment on his book of memoirs, where he recounts his life with Wollstonecraft. As we are interested in studying his contribution to the concept of gender, we have selected an excerpt that seems particularly relevant: in chapter 10 of Memoirs, Godwin deals with what he calls Wollstonecraft’s “intellectual character” and traces the psychological profile of both members of the couple. However, as he starts examining their respective temperaments, Godwin jumps to an explicit characterization of the different mentalities and behaviours of both men and women in general. The analysis that follows focuses on the second edition of Godwin’s book, the best text to trace the usual stereotypes of masculinity and femininity, which play a crucial role in his conception of gender (Godwin 1987, 276-7).
Godwin writes: “A circumstance by which the two sexes are particularly distinguished from each other, is, that the one is accustomed more to the exercise of its reasoning powers, and the other of its feelings” (Godwin 1987, 276). Godwin means his words to embody an undisputable truth when actually echoing an opinion endorsed by his contemporaries as part of, but not only, the imaginary of his age. There is, nonetheless, an attempt to provide a biological reason for this difference under the argument of somatic diversity: “Women have a frame of body more delicate and susceptible of impression than men” (Godwin 1987, 276). This justification is still used (namely by proponents of difference feminism) to emphasize the importance of the body as a female mode of being and thinking. Godwin, however, does not remain the prisoner of biological determinism that would certainly have displeased Wollstonecraft. He alludes, albeit subtly, to the education usually given to boys and girls, considering that the difference introduced into the pedagogical field may be accountable for the particularities of each sex: women, as they receive a less intellectually robust education, are more undeservedly under the empire of feeling. According to the rationalistic worldview typical of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, feeling falls under the usual criticism, which relegates it to the lower level of a treacherous and unreliable gift. The reason/feeling split is part of a long list of oppositions, such as human/animal, mind/body, culture/nature, male/female, etc., amounting to a dichotomous vision of reality which is categorized according to pairs. One of the members of each pair sets the rule, while the other remains in a hierarchically inferior category and is expected to play a subservient role. This is what happens with reason and feeling which, for Godwin, unquestionably parallel the man/woman pair.
As we read Memoirs, it becomes obvious that rational matters, a strong deductive capacity, and logical argumentative power are all characteristic of men. Godwin admits, however, that such capacities may have perverse effects since, if taken to the extreme, they lead to scepticism and the distortion of feelings. Hence, the great advantage he sees in couples over singular individuals is that women’s intuitive and sentimental performance can work as a deterrent to prevent exacerbated rationalism. According to Godwin, man and woman exist to improve each other, since their respective psychic and moral qualities are mutually complementary and contribute to a healthy balance within the couple. We may thus infer one of the advantages resulting from the association of people of the opposite sex: each of them may be expected to counteract the main errors into which the other risks falling.
These introductory considerations are followed by a detailed analysis of the couple’s relationship, which is seen as exemplifying the male/female distinction. Godwin tells us about how he had always been stimulated to value the intellect by cultivating the analytic spirit and logical distinctions. However, he admits to being deprived of an aesthetic sense and not very keen on the pleasures of imagination. This characteristic, which first presents itself as a flaw in his “intellectual value,” turns out to be assessed as valuable. It emerges as an idiosyncrasy of a male way of thinking, which does not lend itself to vagaries and he admits that he can feel the pleasures of the imagination as vividly as most men. His preferences undeniably lean towards reflection and intellectual research; he indulges in a constant examination and re-examination of the different issues which interest him, and searches to improve the internal consistency of his arguments.
Wollstonecraft places herself in the opposite field, where intuition and feeling reign, which proves fundamental to the stand she wants to take. The way she deals with reality is much more aesthetic than intellectual. Her heartfelt generosity and profound sense of justice lead her to adopt certain positions and make personal decisions with astonishing freedom, a quality that Godwin attributes to the warmth of her heart and which has protected her from artificial rules of judgement. He does so with a somewhat patronizing attitude. It is doubtful that Wollstonecraft would have ever supported the considerations and theses developed in Memoirs. Besides, it appears that Godwin’s bluntness in reporting facts about which Wollstonecraft remained silent in her writings led her to consider him to be a dishonest lover.
Rousseau, an enemy to cast down?
Although Wollstonecraft’s criticism has machismo and patronization as its targets, it does not entirely overlook the feminine ideal proposed by Rousseau (Wollstonecraft 1994, 87 and following, 150 and following). Indeed, Rousseau provokes an ambivalent reaction in her. There are unquestionable affinities between them. They both cherish certain values that lead them to share a romantic love for nature and experience the same kind of emotion when contemplating a landscape. They are further united by their strong standing for human rights, to which they are deeply committed. Even as far as motherhood duties are concerned, namely breastfeeding rights and child-raising care, there is perfect harmony between Wollstonecraft’s positions and Rousseau’s. The latter, however, largely confined himself to theorization, while for the former praxis was paramount. For instance, while Rousseau had no scruples whatsoever in abandoning the children he had with his mistress, Marie Therèse Le Vasseur, under the pretext that he lacked the suitable conditions to raise them, Wollstonecraft never gave up on her task as a mother and as an educator.
Rousseau’s life and work are a web of tensions and contradictions. These become obvious in the conflict between his theories and his actual conduct towards those closest to him. Though standing for citizens’ rights, he handed over his children to a foundling wheel, assigning the duty to educate them to the State. While being a protector of women and women’s protégé, he did not refrain from abandoning them whenever they ceased to interest him. Politically, he helped both liberals and totalitarians with his ideas. His theories on education appeal to feelings while also claiming to be based on reason. Therefore, it is not surprising that this same ambivalence permeates his approach to the condition of women.
In fact, although Rousseau depicts women as being closer to nature, it is among men that he seeks support to find his way to it through reason. The process of denaturation that he proposes does not contemplate women. Although he values passion, the senses and emotions (which at that time were regarded as feminine qualities par excellence), he actually assigns them to women; these are the characteristics which demote women to the inferior rank of servants of men and determine they should be brought up and educated according to such rank.
As to the relationship between sexes, Rousseau clearly aims to differentiate them. And here lies his relevance to the study of gender theory, to which he contributes for rather unfortunate reasons. In fact, by resorting to nature in order to justify fundamental differences between men and women, he merely emphasizes an underlying ideology. Rousseau stresses such differences, but does so in a conservative way, reducing women’s status to that of a mere complement, a tool serving the interests of men and society.
Throughout the narrative process of Émile or On Education (1762), man is at first considered on his own. Only in Chapter V does a companion enter his life and, from the very first moment, she only exists in relation to him. The rationality achieved by this female character is always subordinate to her man, whose interests she must serve. In Rousseau, both the revolutionary values embodied by the new man he proposes and the reactionary values displayed by his account of women co-exist. In fact, Rousseau recovers the ancestral myths of domesticity to explain the role of the female character. In Émile, when he introduces us to Sophie, the ideal companion to the youngster he has portrayed, he begins to examine the difference between sexes by pointing out something that brings them closer:
In everything not connected with sex, woman is man. She has the same organs, the same needs, the same faculties. The machine is constructed in the same way; its parts are the same; the one functions as does the other; the form is similar; and in whatever respect one considers them, the difference between them is only one of more or less. (Rousseau 1979, 357)
As the narrative unfolds, however, alleged sexual differences form a picture of women which emphasizes passivity and weakness, in contrast with men’s activity and strength: “One ought to be active and strong, the other passive and weak. One must necessarily will and be able; it suffices that the other put up little resistance” (Rousseau 1979, 358). By contrasting female weakness and passivity against male vigour, Rousseau’s position reminds us of Aristotle. The similarity, however, is only apparent, for Rousseau does not consider a woman to be an imperfect male; rather, he thinks that she is perfect in her own genre. All her characteristics result from having been created especially to please men. It is therefore in her weakness that her power of seduction lies.
One of the theses Rousseau most consistently supports is that man is born free and so is free by nature. Due to several accidents resulting in the loss of this prerogative, he will look for a new nature since it is impossible for him to return to the original one. However, freedom is only recovered through obedience to law. Man is assigned the task of reinventing nature, be it artificial or political. Man-made laws should aim to mend the evil brought about by society. Society corrupts man by acting upon his feelings and passions, which are at first simple, direct, natural and innocuous, but become complex and harmful under society’s influence. In one of his very first texts on political philosophy, the Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Mankind (1755), Rousseau holds women responsible for disorders caused by romantic passion, which is by nature impetuous, violent and, as he himself puts it, terrible:
Among the passions which ruffle the heart of man, there is one of a hot and impetuous nature, which renders the sexes necessary to each other; a terrible passion which despises all dangers, bears down all obstacles, and which in its transports seems proper to destroy the human species which it is destined to preserve. What must become of men abandoned to this lawless and brutal rage, without modesty, without shame, and every day disputing the objects of their passion at the expense of their blood? (Rousseau 2002, 108-109).
Only law can control such passion. Great care must, however, be taken, lest the law increases passion’s violence. According to Rousseau, it would be convenient to find out whether these disorders originate in the laws themselves. As the text unfolds, he distinguishes two aspects of romantic passion: the physical and the moral. While the former concerns the natural attraction between sexes, the latter has to do with the rules which compel desire to focus on only one object. Such rules, imposed by society and reluctantly followed by men, are encouraged by women:
[I]t is easy to perceive that the moral part of love is a factitious sentiment, engendered by society, and cried up by the women with great care and address in order to establish their empire, and secure command to that sex which ought to obey. (Rousseau 2002, 109)
It is thus for strategic reasons that women contribute to the encoding of a natural passion by wrapping it up in rules manifestly difficult to abide by and which lead to more dissension and dispute. All this is obviously blamed on “the sex which ought to obey,” and the role played by women is often depicted in negative and even diabolical colours in Rousseau’s thought. Let us consider two particularly significant aspects: politics and education.
Rousseau’s politics tends towards man’s freedom, so the importance attached to the social contract―a pact of association of each individual with the community as a whole―is reflected in laws that express individual will. Against the concept of natural submission, contractualists propose the thesis of freely established power through common consent. Rousseau, then, abolishes the pactum subjectionis. Relations of subordination are not natural, and the weakest should not submit to the strongest. Hence the reason for his proposed social contract to be based on a pact of previous association. It is this pact that creates a general will, made up of the will of all those who thus become citizens. Thanks to the social contract, man remains free, since by obeying others, he is obeying himself too. Law is the same for all and is the expression of the general will. Equality is something that must be built.
Because, according to Rousseau, society is not based on rational self-interest, as had been proposed by Hobbes, and since the establishment of the pact implies a natural capacity for kindness and compassion, some women philosophers easily sympathize with Rousseau, considering him an advocate of feminine characteristics, namely through the validation of affections. However, he draws a clear distinction between two areas―that of citizenship and freedom, in which he includes men and that of domestic submission, to which women are relegated. Even if the social contract allows everybody the practice of freedom by promising them active participation in power, the fact is that women are left out and subjected to male control. So, we can see that Rousseau supports the freedom of men but not of women. He is aware of this, though, and tries to defend his position in his Dedication to the Republic of Geneva:
I must not here forget that precious half of the republic, which makes the happiness of the other; and whose tenderness and prudence preserve its tranquillity and virtue. Amiable and virtuous daughters of Geneva, it will be always the lot of your sex to govern ours. Happy, so long as your chaste influence, solely exercised within the limits of conjugal union, is exerted only for the glory of the State and the happiness of the public. [...] Continue, therefore, always to be what you are, the chaste guardians of our manners, and the gentle links of our peace; exerting on every occasion the privileges of the heart and of nature to the advantage of moral obligation and the interests of virtue. (Rousseau 2002, 79-80)
The qualities attributed to this “precious half” are a trap. The lovingness and innocence Rousseau ascribes to women are precisely what will keep them under the private domain, a stand from where they may have an indirect influence on the res publica as “the chaste guardians of our manners” and nurturers of “the gentle links of our peace” (Rousseau 2002, 80). Against the radical democracy he proposes, Rousseau bars women from governing. This position should not be regarded as a mere acceptance of common prejudice of the time. It is, on the contrary, an attempt to defend the unity of the political body in which women would be a thorn, as they stand for what is heterogeneous and inassimilable.
Rousseau’s political theory is built upon the subjugation of women. If the social contract is a way to renaturalize men, the sexual contract plays an identical role in relation to women, since it is through it that they recover nature. The social contract among men only becomes possible if a sexual contract has taken place between them and women in the first place. Feeling and passion must serve society and what is private must submit to the community.
The different sexual roles are important for the well-being of the city. Sexuality gets politicized. Having the potential for regulating men’s passions, women’s integrity and restraint must fulfil such function. It is through women that men learn how to love others, starting with those closest to them, and then extending this feeling to citizens and finally to the State. Stability within the family is the first step to guaranteeing the stability of the State. The secondary role assigned to women is further illustrated by the process of drafting laws, which remains a predominantly male task. Owing to the limited scope of their interests, women are circumscribed to the restricted sphere of the men who are closest to them―their husbands, lovers, fathers, sons. Men are interested in the laws of the Universe; women are happy with the laws of the heart. Their political relevance―of which, most of the time, they are not even aware―is merely incidental. This, however, does not mean that their role is not decisive, hence the need to provide them with an adequate education. Rousseau considers pedagogy a source of virtue endowed with a political dimension that welcomes women.
The new man must be shaped by a distinctive education. Émile is Rousseau’s great pedagogic work, but it is also anthropologically and politically relevant. The psychological framework which gives consistency to this treatise reminds us of Plato’s tripartite soul. Emotion, passion and reason are features that must be taken into account in young people’s education. But the amour de soi is the driving force of all human action. Émile must be educated so as to turn self-love into a source of other virtues. Rousseau is a patient educator, who can wait, accept and develop the contribution of the senses in order to achieve full integration with Nature. If natural man is constructed, so the ideal companion must be produced for him: “After having tried to form the natural man, let us also see how the woman who suits this man ought to be formed” (Rousseau 1979, 363). So, only the man is raised to be autonomous whereas the woman must be brought up so as to depend on him. The former is an end in himself, while the latter is only a means, hence the required difference between masculine and feminine education: “Once it is demonstrated that man and woman are not and ought not to be constituted in the same way in either character or temperament, it follows that they ought not to have the same education” (ibid.). Their respective forms of education must respect nature to prevent both men and women from losing power:
Do you wish to be well-guided? Then always follow nature’s indications. Everything that characterizes the fair sex ought to be respected as established by nature. You constantly say, “Women have this or that failing which we do not have.” Your pride deceives you. They would be failings for you; they are their good qualities. Everything would go less well if they did not have these qualities. Prevent these alleged failings from degenerating, but take care not to destroy them. (ibid.)
Feminine nature must be preserved, including its flaws. A woman identical to a man would lose most of her power. Rousseau values complementarity, but presents it in a patronizing way:
All the faculties common to the two sexes are not equally distributed between them; but taken together, they balance out. Woman is worth more as woman and less as man. Whenever she makes use of her rights, she has the advantage. Whenever she wants to usurp ours, she remains beath us. (Rousseau 1979, 363-364)
Just like men, women must rebuild their nature, which is primitive and sexual and, so, responsible for putting them at the mercy of passion. This, in turn, ties them to sensuality, making them more dependent on their bodies than men:
There is no parity between the two sexes in regard to the consequences of sex. The male is male only at certain moments. The female is her whole life or at least during her whole youth. Everything constantly recalls her sex to her; and to fulfill its functions well, she needs a constitution which corresponds to it. (Rousseau 1979, 361)
Female nature is moulded, women are domesticated, reduced to an instrument of regulation of male passions. It is, therefore, urgent to endow women with a second nature, which can only be achieved through the domestication of the passions. These are, simultaneously, a disruptive factor and an instrument of power. In Rousseau’s view, the power of women lies precisely in their capacity to seduce, and they must learn how to manage that power by adopting certain strategies. He considers the relation between sexes to be eminently quarrelsome, an agonistic relationship of conquest and submission. It is the woman who regulates romantic passion through the game of offer and refusal, in which she feigns to obey but, in fact, awakes the man’s desire.
The feminine virtues at which the education of Sophie―the aforementioned female character of Émile―aims are never devised with her in mind. They rather envision both man and society. The virtues of chastity and a good reputation, conforming to appearance and dependence are strongly connected to politics since they promote an orderly and stable society. Sophie embodies Rousseau’s theses on women and the feminine and reveals his ambiguity in relation to women. If, on the one hand, he praises them as educators, on the other, he restricts that role to the education of small children, who should be under their mothers’ care. Their role, however, is no longer sufficient when children become adolescents and young adults, who, according to Rousseau, should be placed under the guidance of a male tutor. Sophie is defined in relation to others―her husband and the children they may have in the future. Lack of precision, indefiniteness, submission, mediocrity, practical rationality―these are her characteristics. She is a shadowy and secluded human being, embodying the prevailing social representations of that time. This is why we can say that, although he does not use the word gender, as is also the case with Wollstonecraft and Godwin, so too Rousseau has actually contributed to the creation of this concept.
[1] See, for instance: Wollstonecraft and Godwin 1987, p. 237.
[2] See Harding 1984, pp. 43-63.
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